In recent work, Anderson and Kuhn [3] 
Introduction
In 1997, Anderson and Kuhn introduced a low-cost attack called the EEPROM modification attack in [3] . This is a physical attack in which two low-cost microprobing needles ' are used, with the help of a microscope and micromanipulators, to set or clear target bits in an effort to infer those bits. In addition to being low-cost, this attack is quite general and practical. The objective of the present work is to explore techniques of raising the cost (in terms of time and money) of carrying out an EEPROM modification at-' A reviewer has pointed out that such microprobing needles can be obtained for only five US dollars each. tack, at least to the point where it is more expensive than EEPROM reading equipment.
In this attack, we assume that attackers can write arbitrary values to arbitrary locations of an EEPROM, and the location of the key within EEPROM is known. This is in fact often the case, since, in practice a DES key is often stored in the bottom eight bytes of the EEPROM. We also assume that EEPROM bits cannot be read directly since equipment to sense the value of an EEPROM bit is substantially more expensive than the microprobing needles.
Anderson and Kuhn's attack makes use of the key parity errors implemented in many applications utilizing DES. Their assumption is that the tamperproof device will not work (e.g., returning an error condition) whenever a key parity error is detected. We will see below that this assumption is not strictly necessary for a successful attack.
The paper is structured as follows. We first describe the EEPROM modification attack. Then various possible protection schemes will be discussed, and we argue that it is not an easy problem. Our proposed scheme for protecting the keys against the modification attack will be introduced in Section 5 and analysed in Section 6.
The EEPROM Modification Attack
Anderson and Kuhn's original attack proceeded as follows. if (key p a r i v error message appears) then re-set the bit to 0 (as it was 0)' Although Anderson and Kuhn originally described the above attack with respect to a DES key and the associated key-parity bits, the attack can be generalized for an arbitrary key, with or without key-parity bits. In particular, to infer bit i, the attacker runs the device once before setting bit i, and once after setting bit i. If the output changes in any way (e.g., giving a key parity error or simply giving a different output) we know the original value for bit i is zero; if there was no change, the original value was one. Thus, the attack is quite general and efficient, and can be applied to virtually any key stored in a known EEPROM location.
Modification Attack

A Closer Look
In our discussion, we use K to denote the actual key bit vector. That is, the key value to be used by the card in encrypting, signing, etc. P ,will be used to denote the physical key bit vector. It is the actual bit pattern stored in the EEP-ROM and is not necessarily the same as K. In particular, it may represent some encoding of K and may take up more space than K would.
There are at least two weaknesses that the modification attack exploits. The first is that P = K, that is, the key is stored bare in the device; and hence every bit compromised is the actual key bit to be used in the encryption process. The second is that the key parity error enables the attacker to know with 100% certainty whether the current bit was changed or not. Together, these two weaknesses allow the attack to be performed fast, using O ( n ) probes, where n is the length of K.
These observations lead us to consider possible protection schemes that could help close these loopholes. At first, it may seem that there are easy ways of foiling the modification attack. We will discuss a few ideas and why they do not work.
Hiding the Key in a Random Location
One may think it would help if we store the key in a random location; thus the attacker would not know where exactly, within the EEPROM, to apply his attack.
By the following reasoning, this approach adds negligible security to the system. Whenever the key needs to be used, its address (e.g., its offset within EEPROM) needs to be retrieved. That is, the actual address of the key needs to be stored on the card. But, is this address stored at some fixed location? If it is, the address becomes, essentially, part of the key; the attacker begins his attack by reading (via a modification attack) the address of the key and then continues by reading the actual key. If the address is not stored in a fixed location-perhaps it is also stored in a random location-then the address' address needs to be stored on the card. Now is the address' address stored in a fixed location?
Clearly, we cannot do address indirection ad infinitum; at some point, we need to store something in a fixed location. That something is, essentially, the key. Thus, storing the key in a random location, and using it indirectly, does not, in itself solve our problem. It succeeds in making the attacker's job a little bit harder because he needs to find the address before finding the actual key. But still, the attack can be done in O ( n ) time. For the above reason, the model we set out in Section 3 assumes that the key is stored in a fixed location within EEPROM.
2.2.On-chip Reprogramming
Another approach that comes to mind immediately is for the card to keep track of the number of faults occurring during its use (using e.g., a counter) and erase the key once a certain threshold is reached. In fact, one can imagine any number of possible booby traps that could be set for the attacker, foiling with high probability any attempt to use an EEPROM modification attack.
This seems like a good solution. For example, if we erase the key the first time a key parity error is detected, the attacker would cause an error with probability 1 -2-" (for an n-bit key). Thus, the key would probably be erased by the third or fourth bit being attacked. For large n, the attacker's probability of obtaining the complete key would be negligible.
However, this approach again adds only a small amount of security. As pointed out by Anderson and Kuhn in [ 2 ] , on-chip reprogramming of the EEPROM requires a programming voltage that would be generated using a large capacitor. Further, such capacitors can be identified under a microscope and destroyed, thus removing the on-chip EEP-ROM reprogramming capability of the card. Hence, the model we set out in the next section will rule out reprogramming of the EEPROM.
Model
We will make several assumptions in our discussion.
Firstly, class I attackers (from the taxonomy of attackers proposed by IBM [I]), namely, clever outsiders with moderately sophisticated equipment, are assumed. In particular, we do not attempt to address attacks by insiders or attacks utilizing military-grade equipment. Secondly, it is assumed that P is stored in EEPROM and that the attacker cannot read the EEPROM directly. Finally, we assume the attacker is not able to see the exact wiring of the device. In particular, part of the wiring will be hidden beneath the surface of the chip (i.e., in one of the lower layers) during the chip fabrication process. This wiring is considered to be the "batch key", which is known only to the manufacturers and to those who need to program the device. For example, the devices would be manufactured in batches of 10,000 all with the same batch key. A single customer, say a bank, would purchase a batch of devices and would be given the batch key. This would enable them to program keys into the card.
On the other hand, we will assume that the attacker can get hold of the device and can operate it as many times as he wishes. Other than the hidden wiring, the algorithm is open and we assume the attacker knows the details of the protection scheme.
A protection scheme is formally specified by the following entities:
1. n -the length of the actual key K 2. p -the length of the physical key P 3. The function encode will be used at the cardprogrammingkard-issuing organization (e.g., the bank); it will generate a pattern to be burned into the chip:
4. The decoding functions and wiring functions will be implemented by the chip manufacturer. For each actual key bit, 2, 0 5 i < n:
Define .4i to be the arity of the ith decoding function. (Note that in practice, Ai 2 1.)
0 The ith decoding function decode; is the function producing the ith bit of the actual key K given Ai bits of the physical key P.
The ith wiring function determines the offset within P from where a wire is connected to the ith decoding function:
For example, wiring;(j) = k means the jth input bit for the ith decoding function is wired from the kth bit of P.
For any valid protection scheme, we require that the same K will be decoded from its encoded version by the chip. That is, if the actual key is K = kolcl. . .kn-l, and the physical key is P = encode(K), we require that for all i, 0 5 i < n,
With respect to this model, the attacker is assumed to know the location of P as well as the decoding functions decode; and the wiring functions wiringi. Of course, the card manufacturer can choose to keep all these secret. But protection schemes will be designed under Kerckoff's principle [ 6 ] , in which the security of a cryptosystem is not based on the secrecy of what system is being used.
The attacker can use the microprobing needles to write a 0 or 1 to any location of the EEPROM storage for P. Each of the attacker's writes to the EEPROM is called a probe.
Possible Protection Schemes
Introducing Redundancy
In this approach, P is chosen to be a redundant representation of K. The idea is that even when some bits of P are changed, there will be no change in the output. It is tempting to think we will be able to design the wiring and decoding functions so that by the time an attacker is able to infer some bits of the actual key, other bits will be destroyed. In this way, the attacker would not be able to recover the entire key.
In this section, we illustrate this idea with an example that employs a voting function and conclude that for any deterministic decoding and wiring function, there would not be any real benefit. In particular, the attacker can always break the scheme in o ( p ) time (where p is the length of the physical key).
Voting Scheme
A simple voting scheme can be set up as follows. We choose P to be three times the size of K. When a new device is to be programmed and issued with, say, an n-bit key, K = kokl . . . kn-l, we create P as follows. For each i, we will program three bits of P such that two of the bits are equal to ki and the third is equal to the complement, F. These three bits will be stored in locations P[3i], PI32 + 11, and P[3i + 21. However, the ordering of these three bits (i.e., which one will be the complement) will be chosen randomly at device programming time. This defines the encode function in our model. In addition, this scheme also defines p = 371, Vi, Ai = 3, and V i , j , wiringi(j) = 3i + j -1.
To re-derive K from P, we can use the voting function which sets ki to be the majority function of the values in the (3i)", (32 + l ) ' h , (32 + 2)*h locations of P. That is, decode; (P[3i] , P[3i + 11, P[3i + 21) = bit value which occurs most often in the triple Although somewhat more complicated than the previous approaches, the attacker can still successfully carry out an EEPROM modification attack on this scheme. The only difference is that the exact bit pattern of P might not be retrieved; instead, the bit pattern of a modified P will be recovered by the attacker. This is due to the fact that each decoding function, decodei, is many-to-one. That is,
decode,(l, 1 , l ) = 1; hence bit pattern 110 and any of its permutations, as well as 111 will all give the same
exists a number of possible bit patterns, P' that evaluate to each K under this scheme. However, this does not affect the attack. So long as the attacker obtains some P' that results in the actual value of K, the attacker has succeeded. If during the EEPROM modification attack, the attacker ever modifies too many bits, a different K will be generated and a different output will be observed. At that point, the attacker can always correct the modified bit and go on. In this way, a usable P' (of length 3 n ) can be found in only one pass of the 3 n bits. Since (on average) half the key bits will need to be corrected, the expected number of probes in this attack is (4.5)n.
Some may think that the situation might improve if a more complicated function is designed and more redundancy is used in P. But the above attack indicates that once there is a change in the output of the device, the attacker infers the value of a bit in P. Thus The proof, which is left out of this conference version, is by induction on p .
This proposition suggests that if we want a scheme that costs the attacker more than O ( p ) probes, we must have something secret. Due to the Kerckoff's principle, we would not consider to usc secret decoding functions. Rather, we will make use of hidden wirings to help the protection. We will implement a family of functions via the hidden wires so as to make the attacker time-expensive to find the particular function instance being used. One possible choice is the permutation.
Permutation
In this approach, the manufacturer chooses (as the batch key) a random permutation of the n-bit key. This permutation is used to form P at device programming time. This batch key is a very sensitive information, and the manufacturer must be working with the clients (e.g. banks) to make sure that this information can only be accessed by the fewest possible personels. Special management procedures must be designed to eliminate the possibilities of introducing class I1 attackers.
To restore the actual key K, the wirings are used to invert the permutation. From the attacker's point of view, even though he does not know the permutation, he can proceed as follows. First, the attacker applies the original attack and, with n probings, finds the n bits of P. At this point, the attacker does not know the permutation. Hence, he does not know the actual key, K. However, if a secret-key encryption scheme is used in the device and the encryption algorithm is known, then the attacker can find the permutation in an additional O ( n ) probes. In particular, the wiring pattern can be found as follows. As the attacker knows the function of the device (e.g., encryption using DES), he can find the device output corresponding to an arbitrarily selected input (using, e.g., a PC) using the following n (i.e., for DES n = 
Protection via m Permutations
In all the protection attempts described above, the attacker can find the key in O ( n ) probes (assuming p is a linear function of n). One may naturally wonder: is it possible to devise a scheme that can provide protection against the modification attack.
In this subsection, we show that by cascading (i.e., taking the cross product of) permutations (form 2 2), we can achieve a design that will be more expensive for the attacker to perform the modification attack against.
Consider the case where m = 2. We proceed as follows.
The device manufacturer chooses (randomly) two distinct permutation functions n1 and n2.
Let K be the n-bit actual key. The chip will store P = 7rl (K) .n2(K) (where. denotes concatenation and in this paper, we overload the notation that 7ri(K) = permuted K with ni). On average, it will take ( ( n -1) + 1)/2 = n / 2 trials to fix the Oth wiring; ( n -1)/2 trials for the first wiring and so on. This arithmetic sum is of the order of n2/4. For example, with a 128-bit key, it is expected to take about 2" probes to get the wiring information.
To further increase this number, we can cascade more permutations. From our investigations, the straightforward modification of the above attack will take the attacker O(nm) probes to find K with m permutations. 
im-' is of
Proposed Protection Scheme
Observation
In the previous section, we give an upper bound for breaking a whole batch of cards for the cascaded mpermutation protection scheme. Usually, we simply need to crack a single card instead of the whole batch of devices. With the above cascaded m-permutation scheme, it is hard io break the whole batch (i.e. to infer the wiring information), but this may not be true for the individual card where what we want to find is the key K. A{, will be a n x n matrix if K is of length n, and K is considered as a n x 1 column vector. The matrix Ad, = ( m 2 3 ) n x n can be derived from .ir by
Using this definition, we can describe the batch key for the cascaded m-permutation as a m-tuples (Ad,, , Al,, , . . . , Afnm ).
The scheme
To remove the weaknesses that we described in Section 5.1, we propose a scheme in which 1. the number of bit occurrence of 0's and 1's in K will be unknown to the attacker; 2. we do not care if the EEPROM can be read directly somehow.
The motivation for this scheme is that instead of storing a concatenation of the permuted versions of K as P , we store for each Pi, a permuted version_of K xor'ed with two independently chosen n-bit words Ki which will not be stored explicitly in the card. This will lead us to devise a scheme that satisfies the above two desired properties.
The basic set-up is the same as the cascaded mpermutation scheme but with the following amendments:
1. m must be odd and m 2 3 (this will be needed later in (3) is a vector with only one bit on. As a result, the encrypted result using this key must be among the encrypted patterns of 000. . .1,000. . .lo, . . ., and 100. . .0 and we can therefore infer the wiring detail of this bit.
The basic problem with the above decoding function is that an attacker knows many valid physical keys (i.e., sets of Pi's) of a special form, and can use these to attack the card to find the wiring. Once the attacker knows the wiring, s h e can work backward to find the key. Instead, we need a method that is not expensive (in terms of complexity of building the circuit) to decode K, and for which it is difficult to find valid physical keys without knowledge of the physical wiring.
Our aproach will be to introduce m new n-bit words 6,, P2, . . ., P,. These words will give us another equation for finding K. Comparing the result of this and equation (2) will A enable the card to tell if it has been tampered with. These Pi's would be set to
where TO ,= rm. These Pi's will be stored in the EEPROM. Note that in this scheme the Ki's will be dumped after use. Their values can only be deduced when both K and the corresponding Pi's are known.
Decoding Function
The key K will then be computed as follows: This yields m different expressions for K If Pi's have not been tampered with (that is, the card is functioning as it was first issued to the customer), the correct K will be returned if we logically AND, or logically OR all these m K's. Hence, K can be calculated via the following steps: With this decoding function, the attacker is unable to derive any information about the hidden permutation as before by by setting one Pi to 00. . . 1 while setting the other Pj's ( j # i) to 00 . . ' 0 and to 00 . . '0. In this special case, K = 00. . . 1. Define l i to be the n-bit word with the ith bit be 1 and all the other bits be 0. That is, K = 11, while
We calculate a first value for K via
where l,, = Mnx 11.
To 
Some Properties
With the modificatio! attack, the attacker can derive the values of the Pi's and Pi's but not the permutation details (that is, the xi's are unknown). In this suksection, we are going to argue that these values of Pi's and Pi's cannot help much to derive the actual key K. The attacker can perform an exhaustive search to find the value of K as follow (in this example, we assume that the card can do secret-key encryption):
1. The attacker picks a set of messages and then generates their corresponding ciphertexts with the working card.
2. Find the values of Pi's using the modification attack.
3. Then the attacker needs to find the value of K. An attack is successful if given the pairs of message and ciphertext, the attacker can find the key K that encrypts the message to the corresponding ciphertext.
As it is known that the value of K is calculated based on K = $:p, M;l Pi, we are going to show that in the worst case, there are a total of 2n-' possible bit patterns for the correct n-bit key K and the attacker needs to test these 2n-1 possible bit patterns for K. Although this process can be done off-line, it still takes a long time for the attacker to get K. We start with the following property on the binomial coefficients CF = of (1 + xln:
The following property asserts that equation ( I ) The implication of this property is that there will be a total of 2*-' possible bit patterns for the n-bit key K if the bit pattern of individual Pi does not contain too many 0's or 1's. Consequently, a brute force attack needs to try the 2"-l possible bit patterns for K in the worst case if there are at least 3 Pi's satisfying the above properties, and the security is approximate to cracking for an unknown key of n -1 bit long. This does not imply, however, that the attacker has a probability of 1/2*-' to guess for the key because the 2*-' possible bit patterns for K are not uniformly distributed. In Section 6, we will discuss the probability distribution of K, and analyze the consequences.
Further Improvement
The scheme described in Section 5.2 confuses the attackers by increasing the number of possible bit patterns to 2n-1. A simple encoding algorithm can further increase this number to 2n. The 
The idea explzits the fact that the attacker does not know the values of K,'s while we use this to determine if we encode the cryptographic key K,, or its complement K,, into the card. As a result, the number of possible bit patterns is doubled. Hence the following proposition: 
Analysis
To attack the scheme described in Section 5.2, one has to guess the value of the key K (which is unknown) based on the values of the Pi's (which can be derived). Although the scheme can be designed to generate the whole spectrum of 2n possible bit patterns, this does not mean that conditioned on the given values of the Pi's, each possible K is uniforndy likely to have been the original key. Hence, we cannot draw the conclusion that the attacker only has a probability of 1/2" of guessing the correct key when the attack is based only upon the knowledge of the P,'s.
We would study the chance that the attacker can guess the key. Using the modification attack, the attacker can see the values of the Pi's and knows that K = @L1 M;'Pi.
As the attacker cannot see the hidden wires, the values of ML'Pi's are unknown. However, the permutation cannot change the number of 1's (and 0's) in the Pi's; this is the only additional information leaked to the attacker. Thus the only chance for the attacker to derive K is to take advantage of the properties of Arl;'Pi (with the number of 1's in the Pi's known) and see if these properties can be exploited to derive something better than a brute force attack, As the M;"s are unknown to the attacker, the problem can be restated as follow: Let n1, n2, . . . , n, be arbitrary integers where 0 5 n; 5 n. Let P l r P 2 , . . . ,P,, be chosen independently with Pi being chosen uniformly from among the C,:; n-bit words with ni 1's. Let K = @El Pi. What is the distribution of K?
We will show that although the keys are not uniformly distributed, their distribution is close to uniform if weak values are discarded. Analysis also shows that m = 3 or m = 5 are already good enough practically to provide strong security if the encoding is done properly.
Approach
Suppose we are going to store an encoding of the n-bit key K into the device as described in Section 5.2, m nbit Pi's with n1, n2, t . . , n,, 1's respectively will be created and burned into the EEPROM.
Notice that these m Pi's are generated randomly and independently. We can repeat the generation process until all these Pi's have some proven desired properties. That is, we can abandon the set of m Pi's if it is not generated satisfactorily (e.g. one of the Pi's contains a word with too many 0's or l's), and repeat the process again (so that all Pi's satisfy the required condition that we will describe shortly).
If Pi's are chosen randomly, then ni is a binomial random variable with parameters n , p = 1/2, and therefore the expected values of these ni's will be n/2. We will study how ni will deviate from n/2 and see if it can give us some hints on how to pick the Pi's.
Chernoff Bounds
Each Pi is made up of a bits. We can view these n bits in Pi as mutually independent Bernoulli variables, with n; the sum of these 0's and 1's. According to the Chernoff bound [ 5 ] , we have, for all 6, 0 < 6 < 1, Chernoff bound arguments tell us that, with high probability, ni is very close to n/2. This leads to the following idea. When generating P I , P z , . . . , Pm, we check if V i , Ini -n/21 < 6 n / 2 for some appropriately chosen 6 (6 will be such that the probability that V i , 1ni -n/21 > 6n/2 will be very high but small enough to substantially restrict the 6 n / 2 size of the range that the ni can appear in). If yes, we keep these Pi's and burn them into the device. If no, we throw away all of these Pi's and generate a new set of P1,P:!;..,Pn1. This process will continue until Ini -n/21 < 6 n / 2 for all i. For given m and 6, the expected number of times we need to generate P I , P2, . . . , P, is less than 1/(1 -rm.a) and, if ym,a < 1/2, we will get a good set of Pi's in less than 2 trials on average.
Results
Given n-bit words P I , P2, . . . , P, with respectively n l , n2, . . . , 71, l's, we would like to calculate the probability that key K has 1 l's, which we will denote by q (n, nl, n 2 , . . . , n,,, 1) . For m = 2 case, we can exhaustively calculate the value of q(n, n1 , n2,Z) using a computer program.
To derive the formulae for q (n, n1 , n2,. . . , n,, 1) in terms of q (n, n1,n2, For the m = 3 case, we are given 3 Pi's with n1 , n2, and n3 1's respectively and we need to calculate the probability that the result K has 1 1's:
where Zl ranges from In1 -n 2 l to max(n1 + n 2 , n ) step 2 .
Using the argument from Subsection 6.2, we can choose the range for the ni's and then calculate the probability for different 1 1's in the resulting K. Once we find q(n, n l , . . . , n,, l ) , then the probability for each individual key with 1 1's is given by If a,,,, ,...,, zm,i's do not differ significantly, then the attacker will need to almost exhaustively search all the possible keys, as no one key will appear with a significantly higher probability.
A program has been written to calculate the values of q(n, n l , . . . , n,,, l ) / C y , for m = 3 and the result is summarised in Table 1 . We showed in property 3 (of Section 5.3) that our protection scheme will give a total of 2n-1 possible bit patterns for a n-bit K. If all these possible bit patterns are uniformly distributed, the attacker will only have a chance of 1/2127 of guessing the key K correctly. 11.) As q(n,11,n41n511) will be close to 1/2n-' when n4 and n5 are close to n/2, this implies that q ( n , n l l n 2 , n 3 , n 4 , n 5 , l ) will be close to l/2"-' if any two 71,'s are close to n/2.
The 
Definition 3
The bit equivalent of a number U is dejined as -log, U . Fig. 1 shows the bit equivalent of the maximum and minimum values of q(128, ll ] n l 1 n 2 , l ) where n1 and n2 are in the range from 45 to 83. The upper curve represents the bit equivalent of the minimum value while the lower curve represents the bit equivalent of the maximum value over I . It shows that when an attacker is attempting to guess for the key K with 1 l's, it is at least as difficult as guessing for a randomly chosen b-bits word, where b is bit equivalent of the maximum value for q(128, ., ., 1). From the figure, it is observed that for a 128-bit key K, to guess for the weakest key is equivalent to guessing for a random key with more than 115-bit long. If we restrict the range to a narrower interval, say, from 50 to 78, the strength for the weakest key is equivalent to that of a random key with more than 121-bit long. That is, if any two Pi's fall into this range, we can be sure that the security of the scheme is equivalent to guessing for a random key with more than 121-bit long. This strength is reasonably good against class I attackers.
Theorem 1 shows that the overall security niay not be improved by simply increasing m. Rather, we need to generate good Pi's. In practice, m = 3 or m = 5 are already good enough if the encoding is done properly; m > 5 may not give significant improvement to the security of the scheme -it only increases the chance of getting good Pi's.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we first introduced the modification attack and then studied and analysed ways of protecting keys stored in the EEPROM of tamper-resistant devices against the modification attack. We discussed some possible protection schemes such as voting schemes, and found that they are not very satisfactory. Instead, we introduced the idea of encoding the key rather than leaving it unencoded in the device. Our suggested scheme can be further enhanced to cover the whole spectrum of key values as discussed in Section 5.4.
In the device, m n-bit words Pi's are stored (together with another m n-bit auxiliary words for decoding); the actual key K will be decoded as M;'Pi where Ad,, represents the permutation matrix for 7ri implemented physically as hidden wires in the device. Keys in this scheme, however, are not uniformly distributed, leading to the possibility that the scheme can be broken by checking for high probability keys. We studied this problem and found that the distribution will be practically close to uniform, if all ni's (the number of 1's in Pi) are chosen properly (that is, relatively close to n / 2 and furthermore, that it is easy to ensure that this condition holds). Theorem 1 asserts that for m > 3, the probability to break the scheme will be bounded above by maxl, q(n, 11, ni, n j , I ) where q(n, 11, ni, n j , I ) is the probability that the key K will have 1 1 bits and K is the result of xor'ing three n-bit words with 11, ni and nj 1 bits respectively. In particular, if ni and nj are in the range from 45 to 83, breaking the scheme is at least as difficult as breaking for a random key with more than 115-bit long. In addition, m = 3 or m = 5 are already good enough practically to provide strong security if the encoding is done properly and that m > 5 may not give significant improvement to the security of the scheme.
However, there remain a few areas of concern. First, if the attacker succeeds in breaking any one device, the whole batch to which this device belongs would become less secure. That is, the attacker could break any additional device belonging to the same batch in O ( n ) time. This is simply because tamper-resistant devices will be mass produced, and the wiring topology will be the same for all devices in the same batch. Second, we should keep in mind that the scheme is insecure against class I1 attackers (i.e., knowledgeable insiders [ I ] ) who may have knowledge of the wiring topology. Therefore, the device manufacturer must take appropriate procedures to protect this sensitive knowledge. Finally, against class I11 attackers (i.e., funded organizations [I]) there is really no/little hope of designing a truly tamper-resistant device, as they may possess equipment that makes it possible to completely reverse engineer the device.
